aggregation to generate both the likelihood that a majority chooses correctly and the likelihood that any one individual chooses correctly.
Our purpose here is to bring the "sincerity" assumption into the light and determine its relevance for the Jury Theorem. One intuition is that the assumption of sincere voting is innocuous. After all, every individual in the collective has the same fundamental preferences over the given binary agenda in that all want to choose the "correct" alternative. Consequently, there is neither incentive nor opportunity for any individual to manipulate the collective decision to their particular advantage at the expense of others. We show, however, that this intuition is mistaken. The argument is illustrated by the following example.
Consider a group of three individuals, all of whom share identical preferences over two alternatives, {A, B }, conditional on knowing the true "state of the world." There is, however, uncertainty about the true state of the world, which may (without ambiguity) be either state A or state B. In state A (B), individuals each receive a payoff of 1 if alternative A (B) is chosen and receive a payoff of 0 otherwise. There is a common prior probability that the true state isA. Individuals have private information about the true state of the world. Specifically, prior to any decision on which alternative to choose, each individual i privately observes a signal, s1 = 0 or si = 1, about the true state: if the true state is A, then it is more likely that the received signal is 0; and if the true state is B, then it is more likely that the received signal is 1. Once each individual has received his or her signal, the group chooses an alternative by majority vote (with no abstention). Three sorts of voting behavior are of particular interest: sincere voting, in which each individual selects the alternative yielding his or her highest expected payoff conditional on their signal; informative voting, in which each individual i votes for A if and only if receiving a signal si = 0; and rational voting, in which individuals' decision rules constitute a Nash equilibrium (i.e., given everyone else's rule, each individual votes to maximize the expected payoff). To complete the example, we make two assumptions on individuals' beliefs: (1) sincere voting is informative in that on receiving a signal of 0 (1) an individual thinks A (B) is the true state; and (2) the common prior belief that the true state is A is sufficiently strong that if any individual i were to observe all three individuals' signals, then i believes B is the true state only if all the available evidence supports the true state being B (i.e., s, = 52 = s3 = 1). Then despite it being common knowledge that individuals' preferences before receiving any private information are in fact identical, in this example sincere voting by all individuals is not rational.
To see why sincere voting is not rational here, consider any individual i and assume that the remaining individuals, say j and k, vote sincerely. By assumption (1) Before going on to the general formal analysis, it is worth emphasizing two points. The first point is that when any one individual votes "insincerely," she is in fact acting in everyone's best interest (given the common ex post preferences) and not just her own. Thus the distinction between sincere and rational voting when there are only two alternatives derives entirely from the information-based heterogeneity of individuals' preferences consequent on receiving their private information (interim preferences), in that the existence of such heterogeneity allows for valuable information to be inferred in equilibrium.
The second point is that the result that, in general, sincere and informative voting by all individuals cannot be a Nash equilibrium does not say that sincere or informative voting by any one individual is inconsistent with Nash equilibrium. Further, there may be equilibria in which some vote sincerely and others do not and where the resulting majority-rule outcome improves on individual decision making. Our goal here, however, is less ambitious than that of identifying all Nash equilibria of certain games, determining which generate better outcomes compared with individual decision making and which do not. Rather, we simply demonstrate that while the canonical statement and proofs of the Condorcet Jury Theorems are correct as they stand given the additional assumption that all individuals vote sincerely and informatively, such an assumption is inconsistent with a game-theoretic view of collective behavior. A satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably "do better" than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived. ' We shall develop the basic framework, essentially elaborating on the setup underlying this example. Sub-sequently, we consider two extensions of the basic model to explore the robustness of the main result (i.e., that sincere voting by all individuals cannot generally be both informative and rational) to variations in the structure of individuals' information. Finally, we shall consider some implications of the results.
THE BASIC MODEL
One of the difficulties with previous work on the Jury Theorem is that from a behavioral perspective much of the analysis essentially "starts in the middle" of an information accumulation and aggregation process. The individual likelihoods of making correct decisions are often described as posterior probabilities, implying the existence of a prior belief, as well as some observed event statistically related to the true best alternative (e.g., Ladha 1992). In contrast, we describe in detail a model of prior beliefs and events that permits identifying optimal individual behavior. And because we wish the model to fall within the domain of problems to which previous work on the Jury Theorem speaks, it is constrained to generating a "middle" or interim stage consistent with the features of existing research on the Jury Theorem (e.g., individual probabilities of correct decisions, correlations between such probabilities). 2 The imposition of symmetry on the payoffs for making the "wrong" decision is an expository convenience only. If, as Condorcet assumed, ui(A, B) * ui(B, A), then some of the definitions to follow need to be modified in obvious ways, and the algebra supporting the results becomes correspondingly messier (McLean and Hewitt 1994). The qualitative results themselves, however, are unaffected by the symmetry assumption. To see this, recall the first example presented. Here, the intuition behind (general) sincere voting not being rational is independent of the payoffs. The key thing is that sincere voting is informative. With asymmetric payoffs, the condition governing when sincere voting is also informative will be modified, but that is all.
That is, if the true state of the world isA, then it is more likely that a signal of si = 0 will be observed, whereas if the true state is B, it is more likely that si = 1 will be observed. We refer to this description of preferences and information collectively as model I.
After Thus when all individuals adopt informative strategies all of their private information is revealed through their voting decisions.5 While recent extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem speak only to certain characteristics of majority rule, we wish to allow for other types of rules as well. Define an aggregation rule to be a map f: {A, B}n -> {A, B} describing the outcome of the process as a function of the individuals' votes. We restrict attention here to aggregation rules that are anonymous (i.e., that treat all individuals the same) and monotonic (if B is chosen when it receives k votes, then it is also chosen when it receives more than k votes). For any such aggregation rule f, we can define a nonnegative integer kf such that B is the outcome if and only if B receives more than kf votes.6 For example, the majority voting aggregation rule is given by kf = (n -1)/2.
Given an aggregation rule f, we now have a welldefined Bayesian game B(f) in which N is the set of players, {A, B } is the action set for each i E N, { 0, 1} is the set of "types" each individual can be, the appropriate probabilities over "types" and utilities over vectors of actions, are induced from relationships 1 and 2 and f, and this structure is taken to be common knowledge among the participants (see appendix).
5Of course, such information is also revealed when another strategy is played: vi(O) = B and v,(1) = A. However, it is easily shown that this "contrary" strategy is weakly dominated. 6 Note that this is exactly the class of rules considered by Condorcet, who, in the explicitly jury context, suggests that a defendant be convicted if and only if the number of votes for conviction exceeds some critical number depending, in general, on the parameters of the situation (McLean and Hewitt 1994).
DEFINITION. A voting profile is rational in model I if it constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game B(f).
It is worth emphasizing that, unlike the definitions of sincere and informative voting, rationality is a property of voting profiles and not of individual voting strategies. The most important feature of Nash equilibrium voting in this environment is that there is, in principle, information about other individuals' private signals that can be incorporated into the decision to select alternative A or alternative B. This additional information comes about as follows: in computing whether A or B is the better response to other individuals' voting strategies, individual i only concerns herself with those situations where she is "pivotal"-that is, where her vote makes a difference in the collective choice, where here a situation is a particular list of the others' private information. Suppose, for example, that all other individuals were adopting the informative strategy described above and collective decision making is by majority rule. In those situations where at least n/2 of the others have observed is, i's vote is immaterial, because regardless of how she votes a majority will vote for B-and similarly for those situations where at least n/2 of the others have 
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That is, sincere voting is both informative and rational precisely when (a) majority rule is being used to aggregate individuals' votes and (b) majority rule is the optimal method of aggregating individuals' information. As a corollary, we can identify when the parameters of the model (q, i) are such that the implicit, as well as explicit, assumptions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem hold: Under majority rule sincere voting is both informative and rational when k* = (n -1)/2, that is, when majority rule is the optimal method of aggregating individuals' information.7 For example, if ir = 1/2, then k* = (n -1)/2 and hence, given a uniform prior, sincere voting will be both informative and rational under majority rule.
Conversely, whenever it is the case that k* does not equal (n -1)/2, one of the explicit or implicit assumptions of the Jury Theorem must be violated. In particular, we know that sincere voting is not informative when k* * (n -1)/2 (by Lemma 1) and so, even if sincere voting is rational, the probability that a majority makes a correct decision will be exactly the same as that of any individual (since sincere voting in this case requires voting for either A or B regardless of the private information). And if sincere voting is not rational, then the implicit behavioral assumption in the proofs of the Jury Theorem is inconsistent with Nash equilibrium behavior. On the other hand, if we ignore this behavioral assumption, for any value of k* (or, more properly, for any values of (q, r)), there will exist a voting rule for which the conclusion of the Jury Theorem (i.e., that the collective performs better than any individual) is true. The identity of this voting rule follows immediately from lemma 2: Whatever the value of k*, set kf = k*. Then informative voting will be rational and-by definition of k* and the fact that there is more than one individual (so the collective has strictly more draws than does an individual)-the probability that the collective makes a correct decision is strictly higher than that of any one individual. Thus an alternative view of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, from the perspective of model I, is this: For any value of k * there exists a voting rule that the Jury Theorem conclusion obtains; and majority rule is that rule precisely when k* = (n -1)/2, that is, when majority rule is the optimal method of aggregating the individuals' private information.
The symmetry assumption on qa and qb found in Theorem 1 is very special. For the Jury Theorem to say anything more than that majority voting aggregates information effectively when majority voting is the optimal way to aggregate information, it must apply in situations in which the latter is not the case. And by the preceding argument, this necessarily involves qa * qb. Unfortunately, under such circumstances, the theorem cannot generally assume that individuals are rational. To see this, recall that the original statement of the Condorcet Jury Theorem presumes that the probability that any individual votes for the better alternative is statistically independent of the same probability for any other 
ADDING DIVERSITY
In the model of the previous section, each individual was one of only two possible "types" following their private observations: those who believed A was the more likely state (relative to the prior) and those who believed B was the more likely state. These types then correspond to the two different posterior beliefs the individuals might hold. We shall modify the basic setup to allow for a third type to exist as well, namely, those whose posterior belief turns out to be "in the middle" of the first two. We do this by assuming that individuals observe not one draw from the true distribution but rather two. Thus a private signal is now a pair si = (sil Si2) E {O, 1}2 describing the observations of two independent draws from the true distribution found in relationship 2, and so an individual's strategy is now a mapping vi: {O, 1}2 {A, B}. (As before, v( ) will denote a voting profile.) Further, we make the symmetry assumption that qa = qb q, where q E (1/2, 1). Finally, we let the prior uT on state A take on any value except 1/2 (the importance of this last assumption will become apparent) and restrict attention only to the majority aggregation rule. Together we refer to these assumptions as model II.
The definition of sincere voting is just as before, namely, that an individual chooses alternative A or B depending on which is the more likely state based on her private information. Since an individual's two draws are assumed to be independent, sincere voting can, without Two comments on these equations are in order. First, since q > 1/2, one of the relationships 13 and 14 must always hold: if 'r > 1/2 then necessarily relationship 13 is true, whereas if ir < 1/2, then necessarily relationship 14 is true. Second, if relationship 13 holds but relationship 14 does not, then it must be that sincere individuals vote for alternative A regardless of their private information-and similarly for B if relationship 14 holds but relationship 13 does not. As previously, such behavior immediately implies that the Jury Theorem will not hold if all vote sincerely, because a majority decision is no more likely to be correct -than any individual's decision. We thus have the following generalization of the earlier definition of an informative strategy:
DEFINITION. A voting strategy vi is informative if vi(O) = A and vi(2) = B.
Thus sincere voting will be informative if and only if both relationships 13 and 14 hold. Finally, as before, we will say that a voting profile is rational if it constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game associated with model II. Again, the crucial distinction between sincere and rational voting will be due to the additional "equilibrium" information associated with the latter.
In model I we saw how sincere voting under majority rule can be both informative and rational in certain situations, namely, when majority rule was the optimal method of aggregating information. The following result states that no such conditions exist in model II. What is most striking about these Nash equilibria is that they actually reverse the conclusion of the Condorcet Jury Theorem-that is, any one individual, acting alone (i.e. voting sincerely) will have a higher probability of making a correct decision than will a majority acting in accordance with one of these Nash equilibria. This follows from the fact that a sincere strategy maximizes the probability that a single individual makes a correct choice, and by relationships 13 and 14, such a maximizing strategy will depend nontrivially on the private information, in contrast to the "always vote A (or B)" strategy.9
Finally, Theorem 2 leaves open the possibility that whenever sincere voting is not rational, the Condorcet Jury Theorem fails to apply because the relevant correlations between individuals' likelihoods of voting correctly, when they vote sincerely, are too high. Were this invariably the case, Theorem 2 would not bear on the Jury Theorem directly. However this is not the case, as Example 2 below aptly demonstrates. 
A MODEL WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SIGNALS
We have found existing proofs of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to be applicable and consistent with rational voting only in those circumstances in which majority voting is ex ante the optimal method for aggregating information. However, the results are derived in a model without public signals, whereas, typically there are public signals. For instance, "opinion leaders," the media, or acts of nature can be commonly observed and lead people to update their beliefs about the true state of the world. Hence, we shall extend the model to include a public signal and argue that in this setting, the consistency of the Jury Theorem with rational behavior breaks down in a similar fashion to that seen in the previous section.
In model III, the source and structure of an individual's private information is as in model II: two independent draws, where qa = qb = q E (1/2, 1). Therefore, there are again three types of individuals, depending on their private information (or, equivalently, on their posterior beliefs). In addition, we assume for analytic simplicity that the prior wr is equal to 1/2. Now, however, subsequent to observing their private draws but before voting on the two alternatives, all individuals observe one public draw sp E {O, 1}. A voting strategy is now a mapping vi: {0, 1}3 -* {A, B}, with again v(*) denoting a voting profile.
We allow this public signal to differ in its "informa- is, the public signal cannot be "too" informative relative to the private signals.
As before, we say that a voting profile is rational if it constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game associated with model III. A number of remarks about this result are in order. The proof demonstrated that those individuals whose private signals were split (i.e., one 0 and one 1) vote against the public signal if all others are voting sincerely. If we assume that n ' 9, then the same logic yields the same result when an individual's private signal is perfectly consistent with the public signal: if j privately observes two is, the public signal is 1, and all other individuals vote sincerely, then j's best response is to vote for A, rather than the sincere choice of B. Second, the result does not rely critically on the assumption that uT = 1/2, that is, each state is equally likely ex ante. Setting uT equal to 1/2 merely allowed us to cancel terms that would be close as long as IT was close to 1/2. Hence, as long as the ex ante likelihood of the states are sufficiently close, the result remains the same.
Finally, the assumption that there is only a single public signal is not important either. Suppose instead that there were m public draws, were m is greater than 1 and odd and suppose these consisted of (m + 1)/2 Os and (m -1)/2 is. Then, given our symmetry assumptions, Bayesian updating reveals that this generates the same posterior belief as having observed one 0 and no ls (recall the equivalence of relationships 7 and 10 when qa= qb). So, upon observing such public draws, sincere voting will not be rational. A single public signal, there-fore, is used only for emphasis, because in such an environment sincere voting is not rational regardless of the public draw.
As before, Theorem 3 raises the question, What are the Nash equilibria? One possibility is that the individuals ignore the public signal and vote solely on the information contained in their private signal. However, it is apparent that for any value of wr other than 1/2, such behavior is equivalent to that discussed previously, and therefore sincere voting based only on private information is not a Nash equilibrium. Conversely, ignoring all private information and voting exclusively on the basis of the public signal is clearly a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, such behavior is undominated. To see this, suppose that if the public signal is 0, the first d 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATION
The Condorcet Jury Theorem and its extensions assert that under certain conditions, the probability that a collective chooses the correct alternative by majority vote exceeds the probability that any constituent member of the collective would unilaterally choose that alternative. Implicit in these conditions is the assumption that individuals behave in the collective decision exactly as they would if choosing alone (and that such voting is informative). The intuition that an assumption of "sincere" voting is innocuous here turns out to be faulty. Although there is certainly no incentive or opportunity for individual gain at the expense of others, it does not follow that rational individuals behave identically in collective and in autarkic decision-making environments.
We have looked at the role of the "sincerity" assumption in the Jury Theorems with three variations of an extremely simple model, each of which differs from the others only in the specification of individuals' information. And in each case, the model is set up so that the features of the Jury Theorems typically taken as primitive (e.g., individuals' probability assessments on which alternative is best, the correlation between such assessments) are generated both endogenously within the model and consistent with the parametric restrictions imposed by the Jury Theorems per se. In only one circumstance is it the case that sincere voting is informative and rational. In model I, where individuals' information consists of a single independent and private draw from a state-dependent distribution, the Condorcet Jury Theorem obtains when and only when majority voting is the optimal way to aggregate individuals' private information. Moreover, if majority voting is not the optimal way to aggregate information, then sincere voting under majority rule cannot be rational. In particular, we provide an example in which the explicit assumptions of the Jury Theorem hold yet sincere voting is not rational. Indeed, when all other individuals are voting sincerely, any one individual has an incentive to vote against the advice of her private information. Within model I, therefore, the Condorcet Jury Theorem as usually formulated is either trivial or necessarily precludes Nash equilibrium behavior.
The situation is more stark in model II, where individuals' information comprises two independent draws from a state-dependent distribution, and model III, where individuals' model II information is augmented by a public signal from some (possibly) distinct statedependent distribution. In both these environments we prove that sincere voting cannot be both informative and rational. Moreover, in both models II and III, all individuals voting for the same alternative irrespective of their information is an undominated Nash equilibrium. With respect to the probability of selecting the correct alternative, that is, majority voting can easily do worse than any individual acting alone (and this is true even when the parametric conditions for the Jury Theorem to hold are satisfied).
Two immediate implications follow from these results. The first is that ignoring the sources of information that support individuals' beliefs precludes analysis of individually rational behavior. And if the objective of the analysis is to understand how people behave under specific institutional constraints, this is clearly undesirable. Second, the appropriateness of majority rule (or, for that matter, any voting rule) in generating "good" collective outcomes will depend on the details of the situation of concern. For example, as was illustrated in model I, the identity of the optimal voting rule hinged critically on parameters governing individuals' information.
More generally, our results reveal the importance of addressing issues in collective decision making from a game-theoretic perspective. In particular, the appropriate approach to problems of information aggregation is through game theory and mechanism design, not statistics.
APPENDIX
Here we describe in detail the Bayesian game played by the individuals in models I and II, as well as the Nash equilibrium conditions; the description for model III is similar. Each individual has a set of types Ti, where in model I this set is equal to {O, 1} whereas in model II it is {O, 1}2; let T= X TiandT-= X Tp. That is, the expected utility from (say) a majority selecting outcome A given the vector of types t is equal to the probability that A is the true state conditional on t, which by Bayes' Rule is given by the probability the state is A and the type profile t is observed divided by the probability that t is observed. It is relationship A-5, then, which is employed to determine when sincere voting does or does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. Further, the "equilibrium" restriction to only those type subprofiles in T.Pi(v) is the source of the additional information alluded to in the text.
